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Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their offspring by providing education, and by 
leaving bequests. We show that in the presence of wage taxation, a small bequest tax may 
improve efficiency in an overlapping-generations framework with only intended bequests, by 
enhancing incentives of parents to invest in their children’s education. This result holds even 
if the wage tax rate is held constant when introducing bequest taxation. We also calculate an 
optimal mix of wage and bequest taxes with alternative parameter combinations. In all cases, 
the optimal wage tax rate is clearly higher than the optimal bequest tax rate, but the latter is 
generally positive when the required government revenue in the economy is sufficiently high. 
JEL Code: H21, H31, D64, I21. 
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Conventional wisdom suggests that taxation of intended bequests gives rise to a typical
equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.1 Whereas advocates emphasize the role of bequest taxation
for redistributing wealth, opponents highlight potentially adverse eﬀects on wealth
accumulation. (See Gale and Slemrod, 2001, for a review of the debate, and an extensive
discussion of estate taxation in the United States.) Especially in the United States, the
debate on estate taxation has become ideologically charged. McCaﬀery (1999) equates
estate taxation with grave robbery. A key element of the Bush tax reform was phasing
out estate taxation by 2010, on the ground of its claimed detrimental eﬀects on hard
work, entrepreneurship, and capital accumulation (see Beach, 2003). On the other side
of the debate, over 2,000 American millionaires or billionaires, including William H.
Gates Sr. (the father of Bill Gates), George Soros, several members of the Rockefeller
family and Ted Turner, have signed a petition to reform but not abolish estate tax. In
their view, estate tax is not only the most progressive tax in the United States and an
important source of revenue, but also an incentive to charitable giving.
This paper, by contrast, shows that taxation of intended bequests can be justiﬁed
for pure eﬃciency reasons. We develop a three-period overlapping-generations model in
which altruistic parents face a trade-oﬀ between investing in their children’s education
and leaving bequests. We start from a second-best world in which wage taxation
distorts human capital investment. We show that, even if the wage tax rate is held
constant, introducing a bequest tax can be Pareto-improving by enhancing incentives
of parents to invest in their children’s education.
More precisely, our analysis suggests that a positive bequest tax is called for on
pure eﬃciency grounds when the positive eﬀect of bequest taxation on human capital
formation is suﬃciently high to outweigh the negative eﬀects from reduced wealth ac-
cumulation. It is generally not only optimal in the sense that it maximizes an objective
1In contrast, taxation of accidental bequests is usually thought of having lump-sum character. See,
however, Blumkin and Sadka (2003) for an important modiﬁcation of this result. They show that the
optimal tax on accidental bequests is typically below 100 percent when labor supply is endogenous
and there is wage taxation. In this paper, we exclusively focus on intended bequests.
1function of a social planner, but even improves utility of all currently living and fu-
ture generations. We also provide numerical results on the optimal tax structure which
demonstrate that the relative weight between a linear tax on bequests and wage income
depends positively on the extent of the distortion a wage tax causes on educational
investments. The results also suggest that the wage tax rate should be considerably
higher than the bequest tax rate, but the latter is generally positive when the required
government revenue in the economy is suﬃciently high.
Our results markedly diﬀer from those in the previous literature, in which the inter-
action between bequest and labor income taxation has been analyzed without consid-
ering the decision of parents how to allocate resources to children between education
and wealth transfer, thereby neglecting eﬀects on human capital investment. Previous
literature suggests that the case for taxing bequests is rather weak.2 For instance, a
strong case against bequest taxation comes from inﬁnite-horizon, Ramsey-type models.
As it is well-known, this kind of framework can be interpreted as a model of individ-
uals with a Barro-type form of altruism (Barro, 1974) who live one period, so that
bequest taxation coincides with capital taxation. Chamley (1986) shows that with
an inﬁnite-horizon, the disincentives to accumulate capital and the implied eﬀects on
the consumption stream are so strong that the optimal capital tax converges to zero,
despite potential beneﬁts from redistribution across heterogeneous agents.3 Although
the zero bequest taxation result is not necessarily valid under ﬁnite horizons, it is fair
to conclude that a potential desirability of a positive bequest tax in the existing litera-
ture typically derives from the possibility of accidental bequests (Blumkin and Sadka,
2003), redistribution eﬀects in heterogeneous agent models (e.g. Cremer and Pestieau,
2001)4 or, as pointed out by Kopczuk (2001), from negative externalities arising from
wealth inequality.5
2For an excellent survey of the existing literature on optimal bequest taxation under various motives
to leave ﬁnancial bequests, see Cremer and Pestiau (2003).
3See also Judd (1985). Whereas optimal taxation is typically examined under perfect competition,
Judd (2002) reviews arguments which give rise to the conclusion that under imperfect goods market
competition the optimal tax on capital is even negative.
4Cremer and Pestieau (2001) analyze the optimal tax schedule when parents have two children
with diﬀerent abilities, but ability is unobservable for the tax authority.
5As some authors point out, in principle, estate taxation can have even adverse eﬀects on equality
2An optimal mix between wage taxation and bequest taxation has recently been
analyzed also by Michel and Pestieau (2004) who assume a “joy of giving” bequest
motive. They show that second-best taxation of bequests critically hinges on capital
accumulation. Our paper diﬀers from Michel and Pestieau (2004) in various respects.
First, we allow parents to transfer resources to their children also through education,
while Michel and Pestieau (2004) assume that bequests are the only form of inter-
generational transfers. Second, we assume that parents derive utility from the income
children receive, rather than from resources they bequeath. Finally, we analyze whether
introducing a bequest tax could generate a Pareto-improvement. Michel and Pestieau
(2004) focus on the steady state.
W ea r eb yf a rn o tt h eﬁrst ones to analyze the interplay between bequests and
investment in education by parents. Blinder (1976) studies intergenerational transfers
and life cycle consumption and remarks that diﬀerential tax treatment of intergener-
ational transfers of human capital and bequests should have consequences on the mix
of the two. Ishikawa (1975) analyzes household decisions concerning education and
bequests in the absence of taxation. None of these previous contributions addresses
our question, namely what are the welfare eﬀects of bequest taxation when parents can
invest in their children’s education.
Finally, our results have certain similarities with those on capital income taxation
in a non-dynastic framework.6 Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) analyze optimal linear
taxes on capital and labor income with human capital investment and ﬁnancial sav-
ings. They ﬁnd that the positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate distortions
arising from labor income taxation, similar to our result on bequest taxation. An
important distinction, however, is that capital income taxation would distort the allo-
cation of consumption over lifetime, while bequest taxes do not distort the allocation
(e.g. Becker, 1974; Tomes, 1981). This may arise when transfers are used by parents to oﬀset
inequalities within a family. In this case, estate taxation may mitigate the redistributive eﬀect of
wealth transfers which may occur within families. Empirical evidence, however, seems to refute the
hypothesis that siblings with lower incomes receive larger inheritances (e.g., Wilhelm, 1996). Kleiber
et al. (2005) show in an overlapping-generations model where the level of bequest enters parent’s
utility that redistributive bequest taxation is an eﬀective tool to decrease wealth inequality.
6See Salanié (2003, ch. 6) for an excellent review of the literature on capital income taxation.
3of individual consumption over lifetime, but may distort the allocation of resources
between parents’ own consumption and transfers to their children. Moreover, Jacobs
and Bovenberg (2005) do not consider intergenerational transfers or altruism, which is
the focus of this paper.
In the coming section, we present the basic structure of the model. In section 3, we
analyze the equilibrium, particularly focusing on the question under which conditions
bequest taxation leads to a Pareto-improvement. Section 4 provides numerical illus-
trations on the optimal (linear) tax structure. The last section concludes. All proofs
are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a small open overlapping-generations economy with a public sector.
2.1 Production of Final Output
In every period, a single homogeneous consumption good is produced according to a
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output at time t, Yt,i s
Yt = F(Kt,H t) ≡ Htf(kt),k t ≡ Kt/Ht, (1)
where Kt and Ht are the amounts of physical capital and human capital employed in
period t, respectively, the latter being measured in eﬃciency units. f(·) is a strictly





Output is sold to a perfectly competitive world market, with output price nor-
malized to unity. The rate of return to capital, rt, is internationally given and time-
invariant, i.e., rt =¯ r. That is, we analyze a small open economy framework with
perfectly mobile capital.8
7The capital-skill complementarity underlying production function (1) is empirically well sup-
ported; see e.g. Goldin and Katz (1998).
8In a closed economy or a large open economy, changes in bequest taxes would also change the
4Proﬁt maximization of the representative ﬁrm in any period t implies that ¯ r =
f0(kt).T h u s ,kt =( f0)−1(¯ r) ≡ ¯ k.T h ew a g er a t ep e re ﬃciency unit of human capital,
wt,r e a d swt = f(¯ k) − ¯ kf0(¯ k) ≡ ¯ w and output is given by Yt = Htf(¯ k).
2.2 Individuals and Education Technology
In each period t, a unit mass of identical individuals (generation t) is born. An individ-
ual lives three periods. In the ﬁrst period (childhood), individuals live by their parents
and acquire education. In the second period (working age), individuals supply their
human capital to the labor market, give birth to one child, invest in their children’s
human capital,9 a n ds a v ef o ro l da g e .I nt h e i rﬁnal period of life (retirement age), they
allocate their income between consumption and transfers to their oﬀspring, from now
on labeled “bequests”. For simplicity, suppose that the ﬁnancial market is perfect and
t h e r ei sn oh u m a nc a p i t a lr i s k .
An individual born in period t (a member of generation t) with parental investment
et (in units of the consumption good) in education acquires
ht+1 = h(et), (2)
units of human capital in t +1 ,w h e r eh(·) is a strictly monotonicly increasing and
strictly concave function which fulﬁlls lim
e→∞h0(e)=0and lim
e→0+h0(e)=∞.10 As in-
dividuals are identical and of unit mass, the aggregate human capital stock is given
by Ht+1 = ht+1.L e t st+1 denote the amount of savings of a member of generation t
interest rate, through their eﬀects on aggregate savings. Such induced eﬀects are, however, likely
only of second-order importance. Moreover, the small open economy assumption allows our results
to be applicable to the state level in the United States, as well as to the European countries. Even
though most of the debate on bequest taxation in the United States has concerned federal estate
taxes, the issue is important at the state level as well. U.S. states diﬀer widely in their estate taxes.
The U.S. federal estate tax has allowed a dollar-for-dollar credit for state inheritance taxes, eﬀectively
encouraging states to collect taxes at least at the same rate as the federal government (Minnesota
House of Representatives Research Department, 2004).
9Human capital investments can be thought of as both nonschooling forms of training and private
schooling.
10F o ras i m i l a rs p e c i ﬁcation and a discussion of diminishing returns to human capital investment,
see e.g. Galor and Moav (2004), among others.
5for retirement. Initially, at t =1 , both savings of the currently old generation (born
in t = −1), s0, and the education level of the current middle-aged generation (born at
t =0 ), e0, are given. (Hence, the initial stock of human capital, H1 = h(e0) is given.)
Utility Ut of a member of generation t is deﬁned over consumption levels c2,t+1
and c3,t+2 in the working and retirement age, respectively, and disposable income of
the oﬀspring (born in t +1 )i ni t sw o r k i n ga g e ,It+2.11 Assuming additively separable
utility, we have
Ut = u2(c2,t+1)+βV (c3,t+2,I t+2), (3)
V (c3,t+2,I t+2)=u3(c3,t+2)+v(It+2), (4)
where u2(·), u3(·) and v(·) are strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave func-
tions, and β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor. The altruism motive reﬂects the notion that
p a r e n t sc a r ea b o u tt h ee c o n o m i cs i t u a t i o no ft h e i ro ﬀspring. It may be called “joy-
of-children-receiving-income”, in contrast to the often assumed “joy-of-giving” motive,
in which the bequeathed amount of resources enters utility.12 Assuming the former
rather than the latter seems more plausible in the present context, in which parents
also ﬁnance the human capital investment of children. By contrast, joy of giving with
respect to education ﬁnance would imply that parents value education per se, rather
than as a means to earn income. Our “joy-of-children-receiving-income” motivation
is linked to Gradstein and Justman (1997), who assume that parents care about the
earnings capacity of children. However, in their model gross rather than net income of
children enters parents’ utility and parents do not leave ﬁnancial bequests. Moreover,
our bequest motive is related to Blinder (1976) and Carroll (2000), who assume that
the after-tax bequest enters parents’ utility function.
11At the cost of some notational complexity, we could introduce either an exogenous consumption
for children, or assume that the utility function of the middle-aged parents would have the family
consumption as its argument, this being optimally allocated between the parent and the child.
12The “dynastic” altruism motive suggested by Barro (1974) in which parents care about the well-
being of their oﬀspring (thus an individual acts as if it would be inﬁnitively-living) has been dismissed
on empirical grounds (Wilhelm, 1996; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoﬀ, 1997). For an important early
contribution on giving with impure altruism, see Andreoni (1989) in which people obtain utility
(“warm glow”) from giving itself.
62.3 Public Sector
Following the optimal taxation literature, we ask how the government should ﬁnance
a given level of expenditure ¯ G ≥ 0. For this purpose, it may levy a proportional tax
on wage income, with tax rate τw, or a proportional tax on bequests, with tax rate τb.
For simplicity, suppose there are no other taxes.13 Tax revenue in any period which
exceeds the revenue requirement ¯ G is paid out lump-sum to middle-aged individuals.
Thus, public transfers are received in the same period of life in which taxes are paid
and the government budget is balanced each period.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium for given tax rates. First, individual decisions are
studied. Second, we examine the evolution of the level of human capital investment and
the level of bequests. Third, and most important, we analyze the impact of bequest
taxation on individual utility. In particular, we ask: Can bequest taxation improve
eﬃciency, i.e., raise welfare of all generations from the time when a bequest tax is
introduced onwards?
3.1 Individual Decisions
Let Tt+1 and bt+1 denote a possible lump-sum transfer from the government and the
pre-tax bequest received by a member of generation t in her working age (i.e. in t+1),
respectively. Thus, disposable income of a member of generation t at date t+1is given
by
It+1 =( 1− τw)¯ wh(et)+( 1− τb)bt+1 + Tt+1 (5)
and the government budget constraint in period t +1is
τw ¯ wh(et)+τbbt+1 = ¯ G + Tt+1. (6)
13Labor income taxation is the main source of government revenue in all advanced countries, so that
interactions between wage and bequest taxation are the most interesting ones. See, however, section
4 for a discussion of the additional role of education subsidies in our framework.
7Individual budget constraints at date t +1and t +2are given by
c2,t+1 + st+1 + et+1 = It+1, (7)
c3,t+2 + bt+2 =( 1+¯ r)st+1, (8)
where st+1 denotes working-life savings for retirement. Lump-sum transfers from the
public sector to children are taken as given by parents when optimizing. Throughout
the paper, we focus on interior solutions of the utility maximization problem in each
period. Using (3)-(8), it is straightforward to show that a member of generation t in
t+1(with income It+1) chooses savings for her old age (st+1), educational investment

















respectively. Optimality condition (9) is standard: the marginal rate of substitution
between present and future consumption is equal to the interest rate factor. Accord-
ing to (10), the marginal rate of substitution between present consumption and chil-
dren’s income equals the marginal (net) return of children to human capital investment,
whereas (11) says that the marginal rate of substitution between future consumption
and (future) bequests equals the net receiving of children per unit of bequests, 1 − τb.
For later use, note that parental decisions imply that a member of generation t
receives income
It+1 =¯ wh(et)+bt+1 − ¯ G (12)
in t +1 , according to (5) and (6).14
14Note that combining (8), (11) and (12) implies u0
3((1 + ¯ r)s0 − b1)=( 1− τb)v0(¯ wh(e0)+b1 − ¯ G),
i.e., bequest b1 left by members of the initially old generation is determined by initial conditions:
83.2 Educational Investments
We ﬁrst look at educational investments. By combining (9)-(11) and observing h00(·) <
0, it is easy to see that the following results hold.
Proposition 1. (Education.) For any t ≥ 1, human capital investment, et ≡
e∗(τb,τw), is time-invariant, unique, and implicitly given by
(1 − τw)¯ wh
0(e
∗)=( 1− τb)(1 + ¯ r). (13)
Corollary 1. Educational investment e∗ and thus, for all t ≥ 1 equilibrium output,
Yt+1 = h(e∗)f(¯ k) ≡ Y ∗,a r ei n c r e a s i n gi nτb and decreasing in τw.
According to Proposition 1, the optimal educational investment, e∗, is reached when
the marginal after-tax return to education equals the after-tax return on one unit of
bequest when invested in the ﬁnancial market. An important implication of this is
that e∗ and thus the gross domestic product, Y ∗, is increasing in the degree of bequest
taxation (Corollary 1). This is because an increase in τb induces parents, who care
about net income of their oﬀspring, to substitute away from ﬁnancial transfers (in
retirement age) and invest more in children’s education (in working age). This result
is novel in the literature on bequest taxation. The other result − that higher earnings
taxation (i.e., an increase in τw) reduces incentives to invest in education − is standard
and straightforward.
3.3 Bequest Taxation and Eﬃciency
We now turn to the question whether bequest taxation can lead to a Pareto-improvement.
T h ew a g et a xr a t eτw is kept constant throughout the analysis, and the lump-sum trans-
fer adjusts to balance the government budget when τb is changed. Note that this is
a rather demanding test for the desirability of a bequest tax. In a ﬁrst-best world,
levying a distortionary tax (like the bequest tax considered here) and redistributing
investment e0 in their oﬀspring’s education and savings s0 in their working age.
9its revenue in a lump-sum fashion obviously lowers eﬃciency. In the remainder of this
section, we consider a small tax on bequests levied from period 2 onwards which is
a n n o u n c e di np e r i o d1 . W eﬁnd (as proven, like all subsequent formal results, in the
appendix)
Lemma 1. By levying a small bequest tax from period 2 onwards, (i) the currently
middle-aged generation unambiguously gains (is unaﬀected) if τw > (=)0,a n d( i i )a
Pareto-improvement occurs if and only if









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
τb=0
≥ 0 (14)
for t ≥ 1.
For the initially middle-aged generation, income (I1)i sn o ta ﬀected by the bequest
tax from period 2 onwards. (Consequently, also utility of the initially old generation is
unaﬀected.) The increase in utility of members of the initially middle-aged generation
(when τw > 0), stated in part (i) of Lemma 1, is due to the positive impact of an
introduction of a small bequest tax τb on human capital investment (Corollary 1), which
positively aﬀects their oﬀspring’s income. Regarding the generations born after the
initially middle-aged, two potentially counteracting eﬀects are relevant. The ﬁrst one is
again the unambiguously positive impact of τb on e∗(τb,τw),a c c o r d i n gt oC o r o l l a r y1 .
However, the eﬀect on welfare also depends on how the bequests received from parents
are aﬀected. Thus, if the amount of intergenerational transfers declines, utility may
decline after introducing bequest taxation despite the positive eﬀect from an increase
in human capital investments. Hence, a priori, it is not clear whether bequest taxes
can improve eﬃciency. The positive impact of bequest taxation on human capital
formation has to be weighted against the potential reduction in bequests.
As general conclusions are diﬃcult to obtain, we attempt to gain insight into this
issue from an example which allows explicit analytical solutions. From now on we
10consider utility speciﬁcations
u2(c)=u3(c)=l nc and v(I)=l n ( I − χ), (15)
where χ > 0 may be interpreted as “subsistence income” of children from the perspec-
tive of parents. It is a measure of the strength of the bequest motive. To simplify
further, let us also employ the standard speciﬁcation
β(1 + ¯ r)=1 . (16)
Moreover, let us deﬁne
Γ
∗(τb,τw) ≡ (1 + β)χ − (β + τb)
¡
¯ wh(e
∗(τb,τw)) − ¯ G
¢
− (1 − τb)e
∗(τb,τw), (17)
Γ0(τb,τw) ≡ (1+β)χ+(β+τb) ¯ G−(1+β)¯ wh(e
∗(τb,τw))+(1−τb)[¯ wh(e0) − e
∗(τb,τw)].
(18)
Note that both expressions are positive if χ is suﬃciently large, which is presumed for
the next result.
Lemma 2. Under speciﬁcations (15) and (16), if Γ∗ > 0 and Γ0 > 0,t h e nt h e
evolution of bequests is characterized by
b2 =
Γ0(τb,τw)
1+β + β(1 − τb)
+ c(τb)b1 ≡ B0(b1;τb,τw) (19)
and, for t ≥ 1,
bt+2 =
Γ∗(τb,τw)
1+β + β(1 − τb)





1+β + β(1 − τb)
< 1. (21)




2β + τb(1 − β)
> 0. (22)
The presumptions in Lemma 2 thus imply that a unique and stable steady state
with a positive amount of bequest exists. In order to examine the dynamic process and
the welfare implications of introducing a bequest tax, we suppose that the economy is
initially in a steady state with no bequest taxation (τb =0 ) and balanced government
budget with zero lump-sum transfers (T =0 ). That is, deﬁning revenue from wage
income taxation as Rw(τb,τw) ≡ τw ¯ wh(e∗(τb,τw),w es e tt h ew a g et a xr a t ea tτw = τ0
w
as given by Rw(0,τ0
w)= ¯ G; moreover, initial conditions e0 = e∗(0,τ0
w) and b1 =
b∗(0,τ0
w). The next result implies that to establish a Pareto-improvement we only need
to check whether the introduction of a bequest tax in t =1beneﬁts the initially young
generation (i.e., raises U1) and the steady state generation (i.e., raises Ut as t →∞ ).
Lemma 3. Suppose e0 = e∗(0,τ0
w) and b1 = b∗(0,τ0
w). Under the presumptions of
Lemma 2, announcing in period t =1that a small tax is levied on bequests from period
2 onwards raises eﬃciency if condition (14) holds for both t =1and t →∞ .
Recall from Lemma 1 that a Pareto-improvement is obtained when the amount of
bequest is not reduced too much in response to the introduction of the bequest tax
from period 2 onwards. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of bequests after introduction of
the bequest tax. Let ˆ b be the level of bequest such that, when starting at ˆ b in period
1, bequests immediately jump to the steady state level b∗ in period 2. If b1 < ˆ b,t h e
amount of bequests increases over time from period 2 onwards. Thus, if the generation
which is middle-aged when the bequest tax is introduced does not reduce bequests b2
too much, so that generation 1 is made better oﬀ, all generations are made better oﬀ.
That is, if condition (14) holds for t =1 ,i th o l d sf o ra l lt>1 as well. In contrast, if
b1 > ˆ b, bequests decrease over time from period 2 onwards, eventually reaching steady
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 tax, also bequests during the transition to the steady state will decline suﬃciently little
so to leave every generation better oﬀ.
To obtain explicit characterizations in what follows, we further specify
h(e)=e
1/2.( 2 3 )










Lemma 4. Under speciﬁcations (15), (16) and (23).
(i) ∂Rw/∂τw > (=,<)0 if and only if τw < (=,>)0.5.
(ii) b∗(0,τ0
w) > 0 if and only if e∗(0,τ0
w) < (1 + β)χ/3 ≡ ¯ e(β,χ).
(iii) For both t =1and t →∞ , ∂bt+1/∂τb|τb=0 < 0.
Part (i) of Lemma 4 shows that a Laﬀer eﬀect with respect to labor income tax-
ation does not occur if tax rate τw is suﬃciently small. Part (ii) of Lemma 4 implies
that steady state bequests in absence of bequest taxation, b∗(0,τ0
w) are positive if the
bequest motive, measured by χ,i ss u ﬃciently strong. Finally, part (iii) implies that
intergenerational transfers decline in all periods after introduction of a small bequest
tax.
We are now ready to study under which circumstances the introduction of a bequest
tax, despite its negative eﬀect on the level of bequests, raises eﬃciency.
Proposition 2. Suppose e0 = e∗(0,τ0
w) < ¯ e(β,χ) and b1 = b∗(0,τ0
w).U n d e r
speciﬁcations (15), (16) and (23), levying a small bequest tax improves welfare of each
generation if τ0
w > ¯ τw(β) and e0 ≥ e(τ0
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− 1 − β
, (26)
with e(τ0
w,β,χ) ∈ (0,¯ e(β,χ)).
According to Proposition 2, if the initial wage tax rate is suﬃciently high (τ0
w >
¯ τw(β)), i.e., the human capital investment decision is severely distorted by labor in-
come taxation, a bequest tax may be eﬃciency-enhancing even if not used to lower the
wage tax. (For instance, if β =0 .9, as used in the numerical analysis of the optimal
tax structure in the next section, we have ¯ τw(β) ≈ 0.18.) In this case, the incen-
tive to raise educational investment may dominate the eﬀect from a reduction in the
amount of bequests on utility. Under the speciﬁcations of functional forms considered
in Proposition 2, eﬃciency and welfare are indeed raised if, in addition to τ0
w > ¯ τw(β),
incentives to invest in education (and thus e0 = e∗(0,τ0
w))a r es u ﬃciently high15 (but
low enough to induce positive bequests in the initial steady state; see Lemma 4 (ii)).
4 Optimal Tax Structure
In the previous section, we proved that introducing a small bequest tax may raise
eﬃciency, even if the wage tax rate is kept constant. In this section, we analyze
what would be an optimally chosen combination of wage and bequest taxation, with
a given government revenue requirement. To abstract from transition issues, we focus
on maximizing the utility of steady-state generations,16 assuming that the government
budget is balanced in each period.
According to (3), (4), (12), (7) and (8), the social planner’s optimization problem
15This is ensured if the wage rate ¯ w is suﬃciently high, i.e., the economy is technologically advanced.
To see this, recall e∗(0,τw)=[ β(1 − τw)¯ w]
2 /4 and note that e as given in (26) is independent of ¯ w.
16As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, introducing a small bequest tax leads to a Pareto improve-
ment if it beneﬁts the steady state generation. This suggests that all generations are made better oﬀ
under the optimal tax mix for steady state generations, compared to a situation where there is only
wage taxation.
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s.t. τw ¯ wh(e
∗)+τbb
∗ = ¯ G. (28)
Tab. 1 shows numerical results for the optimal tax rates, denoted τopt
w , τ
opt
b ,f o rd i ﬀerent
government expenditures with an assumption that ¯ w =1and β =0 .9, for varying levels
of χ and ¯ G.



















0.4 0 0 0.048 -0.112 0.188 0.423
0.4 0.02 0.047 0.079 -0.065 0.269 0.416
0.4 0.04 0.099 0.109 -0.019 0.365 0.412
0.4 0.06 0.158 0.140 0.027 0.484 0.409
0.4 0.08 0.231 0.170 0.071 0.644 0.408
0.4 0.10 0.333 0.199 0.115 0.907 0.409
0.5 0 0 0.056 -0.084 0.423 0.660
0.5 0.02 0.047 0.081 -0.046 0.515 0.656
0.5 0.04 0.099 0.106 -0.008 0.625 0.653
0.5 0.06 0.158 0.130 0.029 0.762 0.652
0.5 0.08 0.231 0.154 0.065 0.949 0.652
0.5 0.10 0.333 0.178 0.100 1.259 0.654
Table 1. Optimal tax rates
Our numerical results suggest certain general patterns. First of all, the optimal
bequest tax rate is generally positive when government revenue requirement, ¯ G,i s
suﬃciently high. This is consistent with the intuition of Proposition 2: Using bequest
taxes can raise eﬃciency when an excessive use of a wage tax would be too distorting.
With a low revenue requirement, however, it is optimal to moderately tax wages and
use tax revenue to subsidize bequests. Moreover, also when ¯ G is high, the optimal
15b e q u e s tt a xr a t ei ss i g n i ﬁcantly lower than the wage tax rate. The intuition for these
results is the following. Investment in human capital exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, while ﬁnancial markets provide constant returns to scale. At the same time
as taxing wages reduces investment in human capital, it also increases the rate of
return to marginal investment. This partly counteracts the distortion created by the
tax wedge. When the government chooses tax rates to balance marginal distortions
from collecting any given revenue, it is optimal to distort human capital investment
relatively more. For the same reason, when ¯ G is low, taxing the return to education
and subsidizing bequests may improve the welfare of the steady-state generations by
encouraging parents to transfer in aggregate more resources to their children. Also
note that optimal tax rates are non-zero even in the case where ¯ G =0 . This result
arises because parents care about children’s income rather than taking into account
the impact of intergenerational transfers on their oﬀspring’s utility (unlike in dynastic
altruism models which follow Barro, 1974).








w (that is, optimal bequest tax rate increases faster than the optimal wage
tax rate). With a zero revenue requirement, this ratio is negative, then increasing and
approaching unity as ¯ G increases.
In the last two columns of Tab. 1, we also report the size of bequests relative to
t h ew a g ei n c o m et h a tc h i l d r e nr e c e i v eo v e rt h e i rw o r k i n gp e r i o d ,b o t hi nt h ei n i t i a l
situation (without bequest tax) and under the optimal tax mix. The relative size
of bequests is increasing in the strength of parents’ motive to transfer resources to
their children, measured by parameter χ. (Recall that b∗ is increasing in χ,w h e r e a s
e∗ is independent of χ.) In the absence of bequest taxation, increasing the wage tax
rate results in parents transferring relatively more resources through bequests. In the
examples we report, in the absence of bequest taxes, the size of bequests varies between
19 and 91 percent of the lifetime wage income with χ =0 .4, and between 42 and 126
percent with χ =0 .5. When the bequest tax rate is set optimally, the range is 41 to 42
16percent with χ =0 .4 a n d6 5t o6 6p e r c e n tw i t hχ =0 .5. This suggests that optimal
taxation stabilizes the composition of intergenerational transfers when the general level
of public expenditures changes.
So far, we have abstracted from the instrument of education subsidies for stim-
ulating educational investment. Partly, this may be justiﬁed because human capital
investments are often unobservable to tax authorities, in a similar manner as the op-
timal tax literature typically posits that work eﬀort is not observable.17 Nevertheless,
one may ask if the potentially beneﬁcial role of using bequest taxes suggested by our
preceding analysis still holds when education subsidies are feasible. For this purpose,
suppose each unit of investment in education, e, is subsidized by a constant rate τe.A
numerical analysis of this extended model with optimally chosen education subsidies,
focusing again on the steady state, suggests that education should indeed be subsidized,
at a rate of similar magnitude as the optimal wage tax rate (results not shown).18 Im-
portantly, however, the main insight from Tab. 1, that bequests should be subsidized
with a low government requirement ¯ G and taxed for a high level of ¯ G,i su n a ﬀected.
Thus, the qualitative results on the optimality of taxing bequests with a large public
sector hold even when education subsidies are available.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their oﬀspring by providing education and
by leaving bequests. Parental altruism is often seen as an argument against bequest
taxation, the reason being that bequest taxation would distort the accumulation of
capital intergenerationally in the same way as capital income taxation would distort
consumption proﬁle and savings over the individual life cycle. In this paper we show
that this intuition needs no longer hold true in the presence of education and wage
17Trostel (1993) estimates that about a quarter of the costs of education are non-veriﬁable, even
when abstracting from any eﬀort costs. In their paper on human capital investment and capital income
taxation, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005) ﬁnd that taxing capital income is optimal with subsidies to
human capital investment when at least a share of these investments is non-veriﬁable.
18Numerical results are provided in supplementary material which is available from the authors
upon request.
17taxation. Wage taxes reduce the rate of retu r nt h a tc h i l d r e nr e c e i v eo np a r e n t a li n -
vestments in education. This induces parents, who value the after-tax resources that
their children receive, to reduce investment in education, and leave bequests instead.
We show that a small bequest tax may improve eﬃciency in an overlapping-generations
framework with only intended bequests, even when the labor income tax remains un-
changed. This is because the bequest tax may mitigate the distortion of educational
investment caused by wage taxation.
In addition to deriving a general criterion for the desirability of a small bequest tax
when the wage tax rate is left unchanged, we also analyze what would be an optimal mix
of wage taxes and bequest taxes with given government revenue requirement. Certain
clear patterns emerge. First of all, the optimal bequest tax is generally positive when
the government revenue requirement is suﬃciently high, although always lower than
the wage tax rate. Moreover, our analysis suggests that, when the government revenue
requirement increases, the ratio between the bequest tax and the wage tax should
increase.
Our results have certain surprising implications for the U.S. debate on estate taxa-
tion. Currently, descendants of only 2 percent of Americans who die pay estate taxes.
Even proponents of the estate tax are willing to raise the exempted amount further.
We ﬁnd that this policy, while popular, need not be optimal. It might well be optimal
to tax also smaller bequest, possibly at a relatively low rate, and use the tax revenue to
lower wage taxes. Such policy would boost the incentives of altruistic parents among
the currently exempted 98 percent of population to transfer resources to their children
more through education. Taken seriously, such policy advice would suggest, paraphras-
ing Mark Twain, that the rumors of the imminent demise of the death tax are greatly
exaggerated.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i) is proven ﬁrst. Note that the currently middle-aged
generation is born in t =0 .A l s on o t ef r o m( 1 2 )t h a tt h e i ri n c o m e ,I1, is initially given,
18as e0 and b1 (the latter depending on both e0 and s0)a r eg i v e n .O b s e r v i n ge1 = e∗,w e
have
U0 = u2(I1 − s1 − e
∗)+βu3((1 + ¯ r)s1 − b2)+βv(¯ wh(e
∗)+b2 − ¯ G), (A.1)
according to (3), (4), (12), (7) and (8). Diﬀerentiating with respect to τb, using (by ap-




τb), according to (9) and (11), and, ﬁnally, using ¯ wh0(e∗)/(1 − τb)=( 1+¯ r)/(1 − τw),



















Thus, ∂U0/∂τb|τb=0 > (=)0 if τw > (=)0, according to Corollary 1. This conﬁrms part
(i).
We now turn to part (ii). Utility of generation t ≥ 1 is
Ut = u2(¯ wh(et)+bt+1− ¯ G−st+1−et+1)+βu3((1+¯ r)st+1−bt+2)+βv(¯ wh(et+1)+bt+2− ¯ G).
(A.3)
Taking into account that et+1 = e∗ for all t ≥ 0 stays the same, diﬀerentiating and































As before, this simpliﬁes as
∂Ut
∂τb


































We obtain condition (14) by using (13), factoring out βu0
3(1 + ¯ r) and evaluating at
τb =0 . ¥
19P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Substituting c2,t+1 = It+1 − st+1 − et+1 and c3,t+2 =( 1+
¯ r)st+1 − bt+2 from (7) and (8), respectively, into (9), and using u2(c)=u3(c)=l n c,
leads to
st+1 =
β(1 + ¯ r)(It+1 − et+1)+bt+2
(1 + ¯ r)(1 + β)
(A.6)
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, substituting c3,t+2 =( 1+¯ r)st+1 − bt+2 from (8) into (11), and
using u3(c)=l nc and v(I)=l n ( I − χ) yields It+2 − χ =( 1− τb)[(1+¯ r)st+1 − bt+2].
Substituting (12) and (A.6) into this expression and using both et+1 = e∗ for t ≥ 0 and
β(1+¯ r)=1from speciﬁcation (16) implies that bequests evolve over time according to
(19) and (20). As c(τb) < 1, the dynamic process governing the evolution of bequests
is stable. Finally, setting bt+1 = bt+2 ≡ b∗ in (20), observing (21) and solving for b∗
gives us (22). This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . If τb > 0,t h e ne0 <e ∗(τb,τ0
w), according to Corollary 1.
Consequently, we have Γ0(τb,τw) < Γ∗(τb,τw), according to (17) and (18), and thus,
B0(b;·) <B ∗(b;·), according to (19) and (20). Fig. 1 depicts b2 = B0(b1;·) as dashed
line and bt+2 = B∗(bt+1;·) as solid line for τb > 0. The steady state level of bequest
with τb > 0, b∗, is given by point A. Let ˆ b be given by B0(ˆ b;·)=b∗.N o wi fb1 < ˆ b as
in Fig. 1, then b2 <b ∗ and, for all t ≥ 1, bt+2 increases over time to b∗. In this case, if
condition (14) holds for t =1 , it also holds for all t>1.I fb1 = ˆ b,t h e nb2 = bt+2 = b∗
for all t ≥ 1.F i n a l l y ,i fb1 > ˆ b,t h e nb2 >b ∗ and, for all t ≥ 1, bt+2 decreases over time
to b∗. In this case, if condition (14) holds for t →∞(i.e., for bt+1 = b∗), it also holds
for all t ≥ 1. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . Part (i) is conﬁrmed by substituting (24) into Rw =
τw ¯ w(e∗)











according to (17), (22) and (by deﬁnition of τ0
w) ¯ wh(e∗(0,τ0
w))− ¯ G =( 1 −τ0
w)¯ wh(e∗(0,τ0
w)).
Using h(e)=e1/2 and substituting e∗(0,τw)=[ β(1 − τw)¯ w]










which conﬁr m sp a r t( i i ) .R e g a r d i n gp a r t( i i i ) ,t a k ep a r t i a ld e r i v a t i v e so f( 2 2 )a n d( 1 9 )
with respect to τb, by using (17) and (18), respectively. By evaluating the resulting
expressions at (τb,τw)=( 0 ,τ0
w) and noting that
∂e∗(τb,τw)
∂τb
















































Both derivatives are negative. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.19 First, note that e0 < ¯ e(β,χ) implies b1 > 0, according
to part (ii) of Lemma 4. According to Lemma 3 and the presumptions of Proposition









































We begin to check (A.12). It is tedious but straightforward to show that substituting
19A more detailed proof is presented in a technical appendix, available from the authors upon
request.

















− (1 − β)χ
¶
. (A.14)





1+5 β +8 β
2 ≡ q
∗(β). (A.15)
and e0 ≥ e(τ0
w,β,χ) simultaneously hold, using the deﬁnition of e in (26). One can
show that e(τ0
w,β,χ) < ¯ e(β,χ) if and only if τ0
w > ¯ τw(β).M o r e o v e r ,¯ τw(β) >q ∗(β).
Thus, τ0
w > ¯ τw(β) implies τ0
w >q ∗(β). From (25), it is also easy to see that ¯ τw(β) < 1.
Now we turn to derive an expression for Ω0. It is again tedious but straightforward
to show that substituting (A.9) and (A.11) into (A.13) and using b1 = b∗(0,τ0
w) as













− (1 − β)χ
¶
, (A.16)
















simultaneously hold. One can show that τ0
w > ¯ τw(β) implies τ0
w >q 0(β).M o r e o v e r ,i t
is straightforward to check that e(τ0
w,β,χ) >e (τ0
w,β,χ), according to (26) and (A.18).
Thus, if Ω∗ ≥ 0,t h e nΩ0 > 0. This concludes the proof. ¥
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